


# Making Safe Seats Safer

How Big Money in Politics Compounds  
Gerrymandering to Lock Up Election Results



Research for  
The Rest of US

2005

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# Executive Summary

Large campaign contributions allow wealthy donors to unduly influence who can run for office and who wins elections in Ohio. This analysis examines the role of campaign contributions in influencing the outcome of Ohio elections.

**The candidate who raised the most money for their campaign won 95% of the time.**

- Big money won 18 of 18 congressional races, 16 of 16 state senate races, and 92 of 99 state house races.

**Winning candidates significantly outraised their opponents.**

- In congressional races, winners raised five times as much as their opponents and had a total cash advantage of \$15 million.

- In state senate races, winners raised twelve times as much as their opponents and had total a cash advantage of \$9.7 million.

- In state house races, winners raised four times as much as their opponents and had a total cash advantage of \$11 million.

**Slanted districts are even worse.**

Fundraising discrepancies are even larger in districts that are slanted heavily toward one party as a result of gerrymandering in the redistricting process. Excluding uncontested races:

- In safe congressional seats, winners raised eleven times as much as their opponents. In less safe seats, winners raised 2.4 times as much.

- In safe state senate seats, winners raised 37 times as much as their opponents. In

## For Non-Competitive Districts

	Financial Advantage	District Advantage	# of Candidates who Overcame Both Disadvantages
Congressional	14/14	14/14	0
State Senate	13/13	13/13	0
State House	80/84	77/84	2

*This chart shows the number of times that a candidate prevailed who held either a financial advantage in campaign contributions or a district advantage due to running in a seat that was tilted toward their party. The final column is the number of candidates who prevailed against both of these disadvantages.*

less safe senate seats, winners raised seven times as much as their opponents.

- In safe house seats, winners raised five times as much as their opponents. In less safe seats, winners raised 2.6 times as much as their opponents.

**Dual disadvantages.**

Campaign fundraising and gerrymandering both tilt the playing field in favor of some candidates and against others. Our final analysis looked out how these forces work in tandem.

- For 14 congressional and 13 state senate races, the dual advantages predicted 100% of the results for non-competitive districts.

- In the 84 non-competitive state house districts, only seven candidates overcame the district advantage. Five of those seven did so by dramatically outspending their opponents.

- In only 2 of 111 non-competitive districts did a candidate beat the odds by winning in a district where the partisan makeup disadvantaged them while also facing a candidate who raised more money.

- In 98% of these non-competitive districts, one or more of the dual advantages of campaign financing or district gerrymandering prevailed.

# Introduction

Imagine that you decided to run for office in Ohio. Among other challenges, you would immediately confront two powerful forces that would determine the likelihood that you could win: 1) how much money you could raise in comparison to your opponents, and 2) whether the district you are running in was drawn to favor your political party.

Current campaign finance laws in Ohio allow large donors to unduly determine which candidates run for office, which of these candidates win, what issues dominate political discourse, and ultimately the disposition of those issues. This analysis examines the role of campaign contributions in influencing the outcome of Ohio elections. While big money plays a pernicious role at the early stages of the election cycle, when potential candidates are deciding whether they can make a viable run for office and when party primaries narrow the field of candidates, this analysis focuses solely on the role of money in general elections.

Political scandals have plagued Ohio in recent years. In 2004, Speaker Larry Householder shelved his statewide political ambitions when consultants linked to Householder were caught strong-arming lobbyists for campaign contributions. In the spring of 2005, federal investigators found that a coin-collector named Thomas Noe had squandered or stolen millions of dollars from a state workers compensation fund. Noe was a prodigious campaign donor, having contributed to most Republican officeholders in the state of Ohio and some beyond Ohio. Governor Bob Taft pled no contest in August to charges that he had failed to report several gifts he had received from lobbyists, including a golf outing paid for by Mr. Noe. In October 2005, federal prosecutors indicted Mr. Noe for laundering illegal campaign

contributions into President George W. Bush's 2004 presidential campaign. Other recent allegations have included the charge that Attorney General Jim Petro gave out contracts to law firms who had contributed heavily to his campaign and other Republican causes.

The endless grind of scandals suggests to Ohio voters that their elected officials simply operate as a cash register – taking campaign contributions or gifts in and giving out government favors and contracts. While there may be some truth to this story, it ignores a larger systemic problem: big donors are able to influence elections outcomes with large, legal contributions. This enables them to avoid making explicit bribes or *quid pro quo* arrangements in exchange for political favors. Rather, big donors can ensure that politicians who are well known to the donor community and who share their self-serving politics can defeat more civic-minded opponents who share the values and interests of Ohio's families and ordinary citizens. Once in office, big money's elected officials know to scratch the backs of those private interests who put them into power and what is necessary to stay there.

But money in politics is not the only influence on election outcomes. Our previous analysis, *Safe Seats, Dangerous Democracy*, found that politicians draw political boundaries in the redistricting process that intentionally skew representation by packing like-minded voters into safe seats that are all but assured to elect a candidate of one party. Out of 150 congressional, state senate, and state house races, we found that 126 of them were rigged to be safe or to lean heavily toward one party. Of those 126 seats, the party favored by the gerrymander won 117, or 93 percent. Of those 126 seats, 111 were up for election

in 2004, the remaining 15 are state senate seats that will be elected in 2006.

While it is not necessarily detrimental to democracy for like-minded voters to safely elect representatives who share their values, when this happens as the intentional result of political gerrymandering it distorts the representative process to underrepresent moderates and other interests.

Our final analysis examines how frequently these twin forces of campaign contributions and gerrymandering compound each other to lock out meaningful challengers who might otherwise truly represent the interests of Ohio's communities. More often than not, campaign contributions further tilt an already un-level playing field by giving the candidate who is advantaged by a gerrymandered district an even greater advantage in campaign fundraising. Who, after all, wants to waste their campaign contributions on a candidate who is running in a district that was engineered to assure the success of the opposing party?

In December 2004, Governor Taft called a special session of the Ohio legislature to address campaign financing. The legislature passed HB1, championed by Rep. Dewine and Sen. Jacobson, which improved some disclosure of campaign contributions while dramatically increasing the amount that large donors can contribute to legislative candidates from \$2,500 to \$10,000. The data we analyzed in this report is from the 2004 election cycle, and represents contributions given before the higher limits of HB1 were enacted. The disparity in fundraising between winning candidates and their opponents will only grow larger should contribution limits remain at the level prescribed in HB1.

# Congressional Races

In 2004, 18 candidates were elected to the House of Representatives from Ohio. None of the races were particularly competitive:

- Candidates who raised the most money won 100 percent of the time;

- 100 percent of the winners were incumbents;

- The smallest margin of victory was 17 percentage points, and the largest was 100;

- Two races were uncontested in the general election (Stephanie Tubbs-Jones D, OH-11; and Ted Strickland-D, OH-6).

- One candidate reported no fundraising – Mark P. Brown, defeated by Deborah Pryce-R, OH-15.

Excluding the uncontested races:

- The average margin of victory was 33 percentage points;

- Overall, winners raised 4.7 times more than their opponents and held a cash advantage of \$14 million;

- On average, each winner held a cash advantage of \$880,000;

## Slanted Districts

However, the districts set up to be uncompetitive by redistricting were also the least competitive financially:

[The following excludes the two uncontested seats: District 6 was ranked “competitive” and district 11 was ranked “Safe D.”]

- Overall, safe seats were 4.6 times less financially competitive.

- Winners in “safe seat” races raised 11 times as much money as their opponents,

while in less safe seats winners had a 2.4-fold fundraising advantage.

- In Democratic safe seats, winners raised more than four times more money than their opponents and won with an average margin of 36 percentage points.

- In Republican safe seats, winners raised 23 times more money than their opponents and won with an average margin of 38 percentage points.

- In “swing” seats, incumbents raised more than 24 times more money than their opponents and won with a margin of 22 percentage points.

- One competitive seat was uncontested (Strickland-D raised \$512,410). In another (15), Mark Brown did not file any contribution reports with the FEC.

- In seats leaning Republican, incumbents outraised their opponents by only 1.4 times, but secured an average

## Congressional Results by Seat Safety

Legislative District (# of races)	Average Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)	Democratic Victory	Republican Victory	Average Total Money in Race
Safe R (6)	38.3	\$8,112,234	22.9	0	6	\$1,475,256
Lean R (3)	27.7	\$1,066,404	1.4	0	3	\$2,117,713
Swing (4)	51.3	\$3,333,176	28.8	1	3	\$893,142
Lean D (0)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Safe D (5)	49.2	\$2,687,331	5.2	5	0	\$790,994

## Congressional Results by Seat Safety (excluding uncontested races)

Legislative District	Average Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)	Democratic Victory	Republican Victory	Average Total Money in Race
Safe R (6)	38.3	\$8,112,234	22.9	0	6	\$1,475,256
Lean R (3)	27.7	\$1,066,404	1.4	0	3	\$2,117,713
Swing (4)	22.0	\$1,805,404	24.6	0	2	\$1,022,397
Lean D (0)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Safe D (5)	36.5	\$2,085,293	4.3	4	0	\$838,233

margin of victory of 28 percentage points.

Overall, more competitive races saw greater amounts of money invested (excluding uncontested races):

■ Overall, 1.4 times more money was invested in leaning and competitive seats than safe seats.

■ Seats leaning R were the most heavily invested in.

■ Safe D seats were the least invested in.

### **Dual Disadvantages**

No congressional candidate won in 2004 in a non-competitive district that favored the opposing party. No candidate won who was outspent.

### **Definition of a “Safe” Seat**

We defined safe seats based on presidential voting results in 2004. In safe seats, voters chose either Kerry or Bush by a margin of more than 10 percentage points. We further categorized districts as follows:

- Safe D = going for Kerry with a margin of 10 percent of the vote or more.
- Safe R = going for Bush with a margin of 10 percent of the vote or more.
- Lean D = going for Kerry with a margin of five percent or greater but less than 10 percent of the vote.
- Lean R = going for Bush with a margin of five percent or greater but less than 10 percent
- Swing = The presidential race was won by fewer than five percentage points.



# State Senate Races

In 2004, sixteen of the 33 Ohio senate seats were up for election. Overall, none of these races were particularly competitive:

- Candidates who raised the most money won 100 percent of the time;
- The smallest margin of victory was 7 percentage points, and the largest was 100;
- Two races were uncontested (Districts 22 and 26);
- The average margin of victory was 37 percentage points;
- Overall, winners raised 12 times more money than their opponents and held a cash advantage of \$9.7 million;
- On average, each winner held a fundraising advantage of \$604,000.

Excluding the uncontested races:

- The average margin of victory was over 28 percentage points;
- Overall, winners raised 11 times more money than their opponents and held a cash advantage of \$8.8 million;
- On average, each winner held a funding advantage of \$629,000.

## Slanted Districts

The least competitive districts tended to have the largest fundraising gaps:

[The following excludes the two uncontested seats, both of which were “Safe R.”]

- Overall, safe seat races were 5.3 times less financially competitive.
- Winners of “safe” seats had a 37-fold fundraising advantage over their opponents. In less safe seats, winners raised seven times as much as their opponents.

■ In Democratic safe seats, winners raised nearly 8 times more money than their opponents, and won with an average margin of 31 percentage points.

■ In Republican safe seats, winners raised over 73 times more money than their opponents and won with an average margin of 35 percentage points.

■ In Republican leaning seats, winners raised more than 4 times the money of their opponents, and won by an average margin of 14 percentage points.

■ Republicans won 2/3 of the swing seats.

■ On average, swing seat winners raised more than 130 times more money than their opponents, and won by more than 27 percentage points.

More competitive races saw greater amounts of money invested: (excluding uncontested races)

■ Overall, 1.9 times more money was

## State Senate Results by Seat Safety

Legislative District (# of races)	Average Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)	Democratic Victory	Republican Victory	Average Total Money in Race
Safe R (8)	51.1	\$4,624,665	90.4	0	8	\$591,010
Lean R (3)	13.9	\$2,416,187	4.3	0	3	\$1,296,456
Swing (3)	27.8	\$2,201,449	132.6	1	2	\$744,969
Lean D (0)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Safe D (2)	31.5	\$420,444	7.8	2	0	\$272,376

## State Senate Results by Seat Safety (excluding uncontested races)

Legislative District (# of races)	Average Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)	Democratic Victory	Republican Victory	Average Total Money in Race
Safe R (8)	34.8	\$3,729,818	73.1	0	6	\$638,872
Lean R (3)	13.9	\$2,416,187	4.3	0	3	\$1,296,456
Swing (3)	27.8	\$2,201,449	132.6	1	2	\$744,969
Lean D (0)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Safe D (2)	31.5	\$420,444	7.8	2	0	\$272,376

invested in leaning and competitive seats than safe seats.

- Seats leaning R were the most heavily invested in.

- Safe D seats were the least invested in.

### **Dual Disadvantages**

In 2004 no senate candidate won in a non-competitive district that favored the opposing party. No candidate won who was outspent.



# State House Races

All 99 Ohio state house seats were up for election in 2004. While there were a few races where candidates at a financial disadvantage managed to win by slim margins, most races were landslides.

- Candidates who raised the most money won 93 percent of the time;
- The smallest margin of victory was 0.4 percentage points, and the largest was 100;
- 22 seats were uncontested (more than 20 percent of all races);
- In an additional five seats, the losing candidate did not report any contributions;

Excluding uncontested seats:

- The average margin of victory was 27 percentage points;
- Overall, winners raised 3.7 times more money than their opponents and held a cash advantage of \$9.3 million;
- On average, each winner raised

\$121,000 more than their opponent;

## Slanted Districts

Seats most likely to be uncompetitive by design also had less competitive fundraising—however the difference was smaller than in the State Senate or Congressional races.

[The following excludes uncontested seats: 10 Safe R, 10 Safe D, 1 Lean R, 1 Competitive]

- The funding gap between winners and losers in safe districts was two times larger than in more competitive districts.
- Overall, winners of “safe” seats raised 5 times as much as their competition, while winners in less-safe districts raised 2.6 times more than their opponents.
- In Democratic safe seats, winners raised 3.6 times more money than their opponents, and won with an average margin of 42 percentage points.
- In Republican safe seats, winners raised nearly 6 times more money than

their opponents and won with an average margin of 26 percentage points.

- In Democratic leaning seats, winners raised more than 5 times the money of their opponents and won by an average of 31 percentage points.
- In Republican leaning seats, winners raised more than 8 times the money of their opponents, and won by an average margin of 22 percentage points.
- Republicans won 2/3 of the competitive seats (including one uncontested race).
- On average, competitive seat winners raised twice the money of their opponents, and won by 11 percentage points.

Overall, more competitive races saw greater amounts of money invested: (w/o uncontested races)

- Overall, 1.5 times more money was invested in leaning and competitive seats than safe seats;
- Leaning and Safe D seats were the least invested in.

## State House Results by Seat Safety

Legislative District (# of races)	Average Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)	Democratic Victory	Republican Victory	Average Total Money in Race
Safe R (45)	42.8	\$6,608,139	6.8	4	41	\$197,436
Lean R (7)	33.1	\$1,030,143	9.2	1	6	\$183,123
Swing (15)	16.7	\$1,950,583	2.2	5	10	\$350,560
Lean D (5)	31.2	\$375,956	5.6	4	1	\$107,992
Safe D (27)	63.6	\$1,372,992	4.6	26	1	\$79,468

## State Senate Results by Seat Safety (excluding uncontested races)

Legislative District	Average Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)	Democratic Victory	Republican Victory	Average Total Money in Race
Safe R (45)	26.5	\$5,321,952	5.7	2	33	\$638,872
Lean R (7)	21.9	\$956,525	8.6	1	5	\$1,296,456
Swing (15)	10.7	\$1,663,897	2.0	4	10	\$744,969
Lean D (5)	31.2	\$375,956	5.6	4	1	-
Safe D (27)	42.3	\$987,626	3.6	16	1	\$272,376

■ Leaning and Safe R seats attracted twice the funding as equivalent D seats

### **Overcoming the Financial Disadvantage**

Of the seven candidates who defeated a candidate who raised more money, two were Democrats running in safe Republican districts where Bush beat Kerry by more than 10%, Jennifer Garrison and Nancy Hollister. Three were Democrats running in swing districts, one was a Democrat running in a district that leaned Democrat, and one was a Republican who was only disadvantaged by \$200 running in a Safe Republican district.

### **Overcoming the District Disadvantage**

Of the seven non-competitive house districts won by the candidate disadvantaged by the district design:

■ Two were Democrats running in uncontested in safe Republican districts. One became a Republican after the election.

■ One was a Democrat who won in a district that leaned Republican by outraising his opponent by a factor of twenty.

■ One was a Republican who won in a district that leaned Democrat who raised more than five times more than his opponent.

■ One was a Republican who won in a safe Democratic district who raised four times more than his opponent.

■ Two were Democrats who beat opponents in Safe Republican districts despite being considerably outspent. These two, Jennifer Garrison and Nancy Hollister, are the only two candidates in Ohio who won with both gerrymandering and campaign financing stacked against them. Both of these candidates raised more in direct contributions than their opponents, but when in-kind contributions

are included were outraised. Both of these candidates are from eastern Ohio and represent districts filled with Reagan Democrats who tend to vote Republican in presidential races but Democrat in state races. Both of these candidates who overcame dual disadvantages were women. Many women candidates do not beat these odds. Only 22% of the Ohio house, 15% of the Ohio senate, and 16% of the Ohio congressional delegation are women.

### **Dual Disadvantages**

In 82 of the 84 House districts that were either safe seats or tilted toward one party, the candidate who raised the most *or* who was favored by the district., or both, won. These two forces delivered 97% of house victories in non-competitive districts.

# Summary

## Dual disadvantages.

Campaign fundraising and gerrymandering both serve to tilt the playing field in favor of some candidates and against others. Our final analysis looked out how these forces work in tandem with each other.

■ In only two of 111 non-competitive districts did a candidate beat the odds by winning in a district where the partisan makeup disadvantaged them while also facing a candidate who raise more money.

■ In 98 percent of these non-competitive districts, one or more of the dual advantages of campaign financing or district gerrymandering prevailed.

In the relatively small number of Ohio districts that were drawn to be more competitive, the fundraising discrepancies were lower. While campaign fundraising was still a dominant factor, it was slightly less determinative in these districts.

■ In 22 districts that were drawn to be competitive, three candidates won after being outraised in a district that only slightly favored the opposing party's presidential candidate.

■ In these 22 competitive races, fundraising determined the outcome of the race 86 percent of the time compared to 96 percent of the time in non-competitive districts.

## For Non-Competitive Districts

	Financial Advantage	District Advantage	# of Candidates who Overcame Both Disadvantages
Congressional	14/14	14/14	0
State Senate	13/13	13/13	0
State House	80/84	77/84	2

*This chart shows the number of times that a candidate prevailed who held either a financial advantage in campaign contributions or a district advantage due to running in a seat that was tilted toward their party. The final column is the number of candidates who prevailed against both of these disadvantages.*

# Methodology

## DATA SOURCES

For congressional races, campaign finance data was obtained from the Federal Elections Commission. The data contained fundraising totals and election results for the 2004 election cycle, and required no further processing before analysis.

For state legislative races, the Ohio Secretary of State's Office provided campaign finance data, including separate files identifying:

- 1) The results of 2004 elections for Congress and the state legislature;
- 2) Candidate committees and the name of the candidate running for office; and
- 3) Contribution records for all

candidates, including in-kind contributions, compiled from reports filed with the Secretary of State, covering the period from 2000 through mid-2005.

We summed the total raised by each candidate committee within the election cycle, defined as the day after the previous general election until November 2, 2004. We then linked the district, candidate name, and election results to the name of the relevant candidate committee. This step allowed a link to be made to fundraising totals for the election cycle and the data to be compiled in one file. In a handful of cases, candidate committee names did not match between the two files. We confirmed that the alternate names referred to the correct candidate and correct race with calls to the Secretary of State's office, and corrected

the files.

Analysis of the 2004 presidential election by congressional, state senate and state house district was purchased from David Leip's Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.

## ANALYSIS

We categorized districts as safe, leaning, or swing using the definitions listed in the Summary on page four and the results of the 2004 presidential election by district. We then compiled the fundraising totals for winners and losers, plus the average margin of victory trends based on the district ranking using database software. Further analysis produced ratios of fundraising advantage for winners vs. losers in each type of district.

# Appendix A: Congressional races

District	Rank	Winner	Party	Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)
1	3	CHABOT, STEVE	R	21	\$519,917	6.8
2	1	PORTMAN, ROBERT J	R	43	\$1,492,481	73.3
3	2	TURNER, MIKE	R	25	\$516,695	1.9
4	1	OXLEY, MICHAEL G	R	17	\$1,604,477	9.7
5	1	GILLMOR, PAUL E	R	67	\$361,412	5.6
6	3	STRICKLAND, TED	D	99	\$512,410	**
7	1	HOBSON, DAVID LEE	R	31	\$1,725,109	67.4
8	1	BOEHNER, JOHN A	R	39	\$1,502,777	37.2
9	5	KAPTUR, MARCY	D	35	\$402,347	2.6
10	5	KUCINICH, DENNIS J	D	21	\$58,171	1.2
11	5	JONES, STEPHANIE TUBBS	D	100	\$602,038	**
12	3	TIBERI, PATRICK JOSEPH	R	25	\$1,285,487	44.5
13	5	BROWN, SHERROD	D	35	\$1,040,015	132.9
14	2	LATOURETTE, STEVEN C	R	25	\$54,256	1.0
15	3	PRYCE, DEBORAH D	R	20	1,015,362	**
16	2	REGULA, RALPH S	R	33	\$495,453	7.5
17	5	RYAN, TIMOTHY J	D	55	\$584,760	54.9
18	1	NEY, ROBERT W	R	33	\$1,425,978	77.9

\*Rank 1 = Safe Republican 2 = Lean Republican 3 = Swing 4 = Lean Democrat 5 = Safe Democrat

\*\* No ratio when opponent raised no funds

# Appendix B: State senate races

District	Rank	Winner		Party	Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)
2	3	RANDALL	GARDNER	R	25.3	\$764,653	198.8
4	1	GARY	CATES	R	31.2	\$488,590	30.8
6	1	JEFF	JACOBSON	R	28.9	\$1,228,727	**
8	1	PATRICIA	CLANCY	R	27.3	\$462,014	75.1
10	1	STEPHAN	AUSTRIA	R	29.0	\$944,022	369.2
12	1	JIM	JORDAN	R	58.5	\$206,190	85.6
14	1	TOM	NIEHAUS	R	34.0	\$400,274	17.6
16	2	STEVE	STIVERS	R	15.2	\$1,033,450	52.9
18	2	TIMOTHY	GRENDALL	R	19.2	\$485,207	4.0
20	2	JOY	PADGETT	R	7.4	\$897,530	2.6
22	1	RON	AMSTUTZ	R	100.0	\$657,112	**
24	3	ROBERT	SPADA	R	24.3	\$1,040,897	182.2
26	1	LARRY	MUMPER	R	100.0	\$237,736	**
28	5	KIMBERLY	ZURZ	D	30.8	\$189,923	11.4
30	3	CHARLIE	WILSON	D	33.8	\$395,899	56.6
32	5	MARC	DANN	D	32.3	\$230,521	6.3

\*Rank 1 = Safe Republican 2 = Lean Republican 3 = Swing 4 = Lean Democrat 5 = Safe Democrat

\*\* No ratio when opponent raised no funds

# Appendix C: State house races

District	Rank	Winner		Party	Margin of Victory	Fundraising Advantage \$	Fundraising Advantage (Ratio)
1	3	CHARLES	BLASDEL	R	1.0	\$261,790	10.3
2	1	JOHN	PETERSON	R	37.7	\$131,694	10.9
3	1	JIM	CARMICHAEL	R	31.1	\$138,088	27.4
4	1	JOHN	WILLAMOWSKI	R	100.0	\$54,799	**
5	1	TIM	SCHAFFER	R	100.0	\$111,495	**
6	2	ROBERT	LATTA	R	25.0	\$77,773	40.9
7	5	KENNETH	YUKO	D	47.4	\$110,345	10.4
8	5	LANCE	MASON	D	100.0	\$48,900	**
9	5	CLAUDETTE	WOODARD	D	100.0	\$23,059	**
10	5	SHIRLEY	SMITH	D	100.0	\$37,577	**
11	5	ANNIE	KEY	D	100.0	\$32,862	**
12	5	MICHAEL	DEBOSE	D	71.9	\$13,358	23.0
13	5	MICHAEL	SKINDELL	D	100.0	\$42,042	**
14	5	DALE	MILLER	D	51.5	\$135,878	192.4
15	5	TIMOTHY	DEGEETER	D	35.0	\$110,283	6.3
16	2	SALLY	KILBANE	R	17.5	\$88,153	8.1
17	3	JAMES	TRAKAS	R	6.4	\$112,357	1.8
18	2	THOMAS	PATTON	R	33.2	\$382,692	94.8
19	1	LARRY	FLOWERS	R	19.9	\$145,573	154.5
20	3	JAMES	MCGREGOR	R	11.1	\$126,705	43.4
21	3	LINDA	REIDELBACH	R	5.2	\$71,683	2.8
22	3	JAMES	HUGHES	R	21.6	\$245,121	44.6
23	1	LARRY	WOLPERT	R	100.0	\$66,765	**
24	3	GEOFFREY	SMITH	R	12.7	\$158,577	7.4
25	5	DANIEL	STEWART	D	9.9	\$103,448	1.5
26	5	MIKE	MITCHELL	D	100.0	\$26,950	**
27	5	JOYCE	BEATTY	D	100.0	\$68,679	**
28	2	JAMES	RAUSSEN	R	6.3	\$204,189	7.0
29	1	LOUIS	BLESSING	R	12.3	\$42,314	6.3
30	1	WILLIAM	SEITZ	R	45.8	\$277,979	14.1
31	4	STEVEN	DRIEHAUS	D	38.7	\$100,104	14.7
32	5	CATHERINE	BARRETT	D	100.0	\$37,132	**
33	5	TYRONE	YATES	D	47.7	\$36,956	44.0
34	1	THOMAS	BRINKMAN	R	20.1	\$235,952	83.6
35	1	MICHELLE	SCHNEIDER	R	45.3	\$116,685	**
36	1	ARLENE	SETZER	R	24.1	\$103,549	3.7
37	1	JON	HUSTED	R	30.0	\$1,143,033	83.9
38	1	JOHN	WHITE	R	21.3	\$104,562	7.5
39	5	DIXIE	ALLEN	D	55.0	\$28,431	5.5
40	5	FRED	STRAHORN	D	40.3	\$69,631	**
41	3	BRIAN	WILLIAMS	D	0.4	(\$291,312)	0.4



42	3	JOHN	WIDOWFIELD	R	13.8	\$106,015	13.0
43	3	MARY	TAYLOR	R	15.2	\$297,072	223.6
44	5	BARBARA	SYKES	D	100.0	\$35,469	**
45	5	ROBERT	OTTERMAN	D	48.2	\$33,670	11.0
46	1	MARK	WAGONER	R	24.1	\$186,477	4.0
47	5	PETER	UJVAGI	D	42.4	\$35,556	2.4
48	5	EDNA	BROWN	D	100.0	\$32,695	**
49	5	JEANINE	PERRY	D	42.5	\$4,043	1.2
50	2	JOHN	HAGAN	R	16.2	\$92,168	2.4
51	2	SCOTT	OELSLAGER	R	100.0	\$73,618	**
52	5	WILLIAM	HEALY	D	42.1	\$6,371	1.5
53	1	SHAWN	WEBSTER	R	31.7	\$117,164	75.7
54	1	COURTNEY	COMBS	R	100.0	\$50,160	**
55	1	WILLIAM	COLEY	R	40.2	\$32,840	**
56	5	JOSEPH	KOZIURA	D	47.7	\$61,648	21.7
57	3	EARL	MARTIN	R	4.5	\$796,943	6.8
58	1	KATHLEEN	WALCHER	R	8.0	\$270,044	2.7
59	5	KENNETH	CARANO	D	23.6	\$21,209	2.9
60	5	SYLVESTER	PATTON	D	64.1	\$51,939	9.9
61	3	JOHN	BOCCIERI	D	31.1	\$125,314	4.7
62	3	LORRAINE	FENDE	D	6.7	(\$353,859)	0.3
63	3	TIMOTHY	CASELL	D	0.9	(\$119,255)	0.4
64	5	RANDY	LAW	R	8.0	\$131,755	4.1
65	5	SANDRA	STABILE HARWOOD	D	41.3	\$33,107	3.7
66	1	JOSEPH	UECKER	R	100.0	\$108,976	**
67	1	THOMAS	RAGA	R	100.0	\$512,227	**
68	4	KATHLEEN	CHANDLER	D	27.6	\$30,313	4.9
69	1	CHARLES	CALVERT	R	10.7	\$221,031	5.2
70	1	KEVIN	DEWINE	R	38.6	\$539,770	1311.1
71	1	DAVID	EVANS	R	15.4	\$95,373	8.3
72	3	MERLE	KEARNS	R	19.6	\$126,748	10.0
73	1	BILL	HARTNETT	D	100.0	\$91,994	**
74	1	STEPHEN	BUEHRER	R	100.0	\$181,157	**
75	1	JAMES	HOOPS	R	38.4	\$227,631	18.3
76	1	MICHAEL	GILB	R	36.0	\$52,251	**
77	1	KEITH	FABER	R	39.6	\$189,600	86.6
78	1	DERRICK	SEAVER	D	100.0	\$31,799	**
79	1	DIANA	FESSLER	R	32.3	\$60,866	3.4
80	3	CHRIS	REDFERN	D	100.0	\$286,685	**
81	1	JEFFREY	WAGNER	R	18.6	\$135,775	2.6
82	1	STEVE	REINHARD	R	24.0	\$82,076	18.0
83	1	ANTHONY	CORE	R	45.4	\$50,767	**
84	1	CHRIS	WIDENER	R	31.7	\$169,341	19.0
85	1	JOHN	SCHLICHTER	R	24.8	\$100,116	96.3
86	1	DAVID	DANIELS	R	22.2	\$62,238	3.8
87	1	CLYDE	EVANS	R	31.0	\$114,942	18.9
88	1	DANNY	BUBP	R	24.8	\$84,845	3.9

89	2	THOMAS	BOOK	D	33.4	\$111,551	20.0
90	1	THOM	COLLIER	R	25.7	\$41,189	5.6
91	1	RON	HOOD	R	5.3	(\$204)	1.0
92	4	JIMMY	STEWART	R	17.2	\$184,916	5.6
93	1	JENNIFER	GARRISON	D	3.3	(\$85,633)	0.4
94	1	JAMES	ASLANIDES	R	100.0	\$76,815	**
95	4	JOHN	DOMENICK	D	37.7	(\$9,604)	0.5
96	1	ALLAN	SAYRE	D	8.6	(\$67,357)	0.7
97	1	ROBERT	GIBBS	R	29.6	\$99,108	92.9
98	1	MATTHEW	DOLAN	R	30.4	\$102,272	8.5
99	4	L.	DISTEL	D	34.6	\$70,227	8.7

*\*Rank 1 = Safe Republican 2 = Lean Republican 3 = Swing 4 = Lean Democrat 5 = Safe Democrat*

*\*\* No ratio when opponent raised no funds*